Introduction
============

Travel restrictions were included in the *WHO interim protocol: rapid operations to contain the initial emergence of pandemic influenza* that was published in 2007 by the World Health Organization (WHO).[@R1] However, as they would hamper global travel and trade, such restrictions are not recommended by WHO once the global spread of pandemic influenza is established.[@R2]^,^[@R3] In 2009, some countries applied travel restrictions as one of several strategies to prevent the introduction of the influenza virus A(H1N1)pdm09 into their territories but the effectiveness of this approach has subsequently been questioned.[@R4] Research on influenza has focused on the evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of pharmaceutical interventions.[@R5] As quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of travel restrictions in pandemic situations tends to be more challenging, there are scarce data on this topic. In any meta-analysis of surveillance data from multiple studies, it is difficult to quantify and compare the effectiveness of travel restrictions because such interventions are frequently implemented with other countermeasures and without following standardized protocols.[@R6] However, mathematical models can be used to predict the effectiveness of each type of intervention and inform policy-makers at national and international levels. In 2009, a systematic review of studies based on such models revealed limited evidence of the effectiveness of restrictions in air travel -- within and between countries -- in the containment of pandemic influenza.[@R7] There has been no more recent systematic assessment of the effectiveness of restrictions in land, sea or air travel as isolated interventions. We therefore decided to assess the effectiveness of travel restrictions in the rapid containment of influenza strains with pandemic potential, in a systematic review that incorporated data collected during the 2009 pandemic.

Methods
=======

Before commencement, our protocol was registered with PROSPERO -- the international prospective register of scientific reviews maintained by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's National Institute for Health Research.[@R8] We conducted a systematic review according to the requirements of the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statement.[@R9] We assessed the evidence for restrictions in internal travel -- travel within the same country -- or international travel -- travel between two or more countries -- affecting the spread of influenza. We considered the air, terrestrial or maritime transportation of humans to or within countries affected by seasonal or pandemic influenza. The outcome measures of interest were epidemiological characteristics and some viral transmission parameters of influenza such as the basic reproductive number (*R*~0~). Studies eligible for inclusion were reports, reviews, meta-analyses, mathematical modelling studies and observational and experimental studies published before May 2014. Studies that only evaluated the spread of influenza in animals or animal products were excluded.

Search strategy
---------------

We searched numerous health-care databases and sources of grey literature ([Box 1](#B1){ref-type="boxed-text"}). Critical keywords and thesaurus heading terms were initially tailored to MEDLINE searches and then adapted for other sources as necessary. The full search construct was included in the registered protocol.[@R10] We contacted field experts and undertook reference and citation tracking to identify further relevant literature.

###### Sources of literature included in this systematic review

### Health-care databases

-   CINAHL (Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature)

-   Cochrane Library -- Central Register of Controlled Trials

-   EMBASE

-   PubMed -- including MEDLINE

-   World Health Organization Global Index Medicus

### Evidence-based reviews

-   Bandolier

-   Cochrane Library -- Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects, Health Technology Assessment Database, NHS Economic Evaluation Database

### Guidelines

-   United Kingdom Department of Health

-   United Kingdom National Institute for Health Care and Excellence -- Evidence Search

-   United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention -- Guidance

### Grey literature

-   Consultation with domain experts -- Martin Cetron (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta), John Edmunds (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London), Peter Grove (Department of Health, London), Richard J Pitman (Oxford Outcomes, Oxford)

-   OpenSIGLE system for information on grey literature in Europe

-   United Kingdom National Institute for Health Care and Excellence -- Evidence Search

-   Web of Science

### Manual searching of relevant journals

-   Eurosurveillance

-   Emerging Infectious Diseases

### Reference tracking

-   Reference lists of all studies selected for inclusion were searched to identify further relevant studies

### Citation tracking

-   Web of Science -- Science Citation Index

-   Google Scholar

### Internet searching

-   [www.google.com](http://www.google.com)

-   [www.dh.gov.uk](http://www.dh.gov.uk)

-   [www.hpa.org.uk](http://www.hpa.org.uk) -- now: [www.phe.gov](http://www.phe.gov)

-   [www.who.int](http://www.who.int)

-   [www.cdc.gov](http://www.cdc.gov)

-   [www.flu.gov](http://www.flu.gov)

Study selection
---------------

All records identified were imported into the EndNote X6 software package (Thomson Reuters, San Francisco, United States of America). Following the removal of duplicates, all remaining records were screened for inclusion against the protocol's eligibility criteria by two researchers.[@R8] We used a three-stage sifting approach to review titles, abstracts and full texts. Where disagreements arose, a third reviewer provided arbitration.[@R8]

Data extraction
---------------

All records that met the eligibility criteria were subject to data extraction. Two reviewers independently extracted study data using a piloted form; any disagreements were resolved with a third reviewer. The full list of data items extracted is available on PROSPERO.[@R8]

Assessing risk of bias
----------------------

Risk of bias was assessed at both study and outcome level. We used an evaluation tool developed by the United States Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality[@R11] for assessing such risk in reviews. Since we are not aware of a previously validated instrument to assess risk of bias in mathematical modelling studies, we developed a tool based on the principles for the construction of mathematical models recommended by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine,[@R12] in consultation with an experienced modeller[@R8] (see Appendix A; available at: <http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/groups/healthprotection/documents/supplementary-data-sr-travel-restrictions-influenza-mateus-et-al-220914.pdf>).

Summary measures and data synthesis
-----------------------------------

Descriptive statistics were calculated using Excel 2010 (Microsoft, Richmond, USA). We used a recognized framework to synthesize the extracted data and assessments of risk of bias in a narrative style.[@R13]

Results
=======

Study selection and characteristics
-----------------------------------

Before removal of duplicates, we identified 8836 potentially relevant records. However, only 23 studies -- 19 mathematical modelling studies, one time-series analysis, two literature reviews and one systematic review -- met our eligibility criteria ([Fig. 1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}).[@R4]^,^[@R7]^,^[@R14]^--^[@R34]

![**Flowchart for the selection of studies on the effectiveness of travel restriction in the containment of human influenza**](BLT.14.135590-F1){#F1}

Of the modelling studies included, 14 used stochastic models,[@R4]^,^[@R15]^,^[@R16]^,^[@R22]^,^[@R23]^,^[@R25]^--^[@R29]^,^[@R31]^--^[@R34] two used deterministic models,[@R18]^,^[@R19] two used a combination of both stochastic and deterministic methods[@R14]^,^[@R17] and one used a Poisson regression model.[@R24] Six studies[@R15]^--^[@R19]^,^[@R31] were based on meta-population models of influenza spread[@R35] and one[@R4] on an alternative model.[@R36] The focus of the included studies was the effectiveness of internal[@R22]^,^[@R23]^,^[@R26]^,^[@R27]^,^[@R29] or international[@R4]^,^[@R14]^--^[@R19]^,^[@R24]^,^[@R25]^,^[@R31]^--^[@R34] travel restrictions or combined internal and international travel restrictions.[@R28]^,^[@R30] All but three of our included studies involved assessments of the impact of restrictions on air travel.[@R22]^,^[@R25]^,^[@R26] Only one assessed the impact of restrictions on aerial, maritime and terrestrial transportation.[@R34] The characteristics of the included modelling studies and time-series analysis are presented in Appendix A.

The systematic review that we included synthesized evidence from modelling studies published between 1990 and September 2009.[@R7] The literature reviews that we included evaluated evidence from mathematical modelling studies on the containment of pandemic influenza and evidence used for preparedness planning in the United Kingdom.[@R20]^,^[@R21]

Risk of bias within studies
---------------------------

Of the 20 studies based on mathematical modelling or time-series analysis, 17 were found to be at low risk of bias ([Table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}). The other three were found to be at moderate risk of bias --because of limitations in the study design[@R22]^,^[@R24] or the low quality of travel data.[@R25] Methodological issues that may have led to bias included a lack of transmission variation during the progression of epidemics, seasonality, heterogeneous mixing and varying susceptibility of populations.[@R14]^,^[@R26]^,^[@R27]^,^[@R29]^,^[@R34]

###### Risk of bias assessments of mathematical modelling studies or time-series analysis on the effectiveness of travel restrictions to reduce influenza transmission

  Study                                  Domain of bias^a^                                                                                              
  -------------------------------------- ------------------- ----- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----- ----- ------ ---------- ------
  Bajardi et al. (2011)[@R4]             Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   Low    Low        Low
  Bolton et al. (2012)[@R26]             Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   Low    Moderate   Low
  Brownstein et al. (2006)[@R30]^,b^     Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   Low    Low        High
  Chong and Ying Zee (2012)[@R34]        Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   NS     Low        Low
  Ciofi degli Atti et al. (2008)[@R17]   Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Moderate   Low   Low   Low    Low        High
  Colizza et al. (2007)[@R15]            Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   NS     NS         Low
  Cooper et al. (2006)[@R16]             Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   NS     Low        Low
  Eichner et al. (2009)[@R25]            Low                 Low   Low        Low        Moderate   Low        Moderate   Low   Low   NS     NS         High
  Epstein et al. (2007)[@R31]            Low                 Low   Moderate   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   NS     NS         Low
  Ferguson et al. (2006)[@R28]           Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   High   Low        Low
  Flahault et al. (2006)[@R18]           Low                 Low   Low        Low        Moderate   Low        Moderate   Low   Low   NS     NS         Low
  Germann et al. (2006)[@R27]            Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   High   NS         Low
  Hsieh et al. (2007)[@R22]              Low                 Low   Low        Moderate   Low        Moderate   Low        Low   Low   NS     NS         High
  Hollingsworth et al. (2006)[@R33]      Low                 Low   Moderate   Low        Low        Low        Moderate   Low   Low   NS     NS         High
  Kernéis et al. (2008)[@R19]            Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   High   Low        Low
  Lam et al. (2011)[@R14]                Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Moderate   Low   Low   High   No         Low
  Lee et al. (2012)[@R23]                Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   High   Low        Low
  Marcelino & Kaiser (2012)[@R32]        Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   High   NS         Low
  Scalia Tomba & Wallinga (2008)[@R24]   Low                 Low   Low        Low        Moderate   Moderate   Moderate   Low   Low   High   NS         High
  Wood et al. (2007)[@R29]               Low                 Low   Low        Low        Low        Low        Low        Low   Low   NS     NS         Low

NS: not specified.

^a^ For each domain of interest, risk of bias was categorized as low if the authors addressed the domain adequately, moderate if the authors' coverage of the domain was superficial or incomplete, and high if the authors reported coverage of the domain was poor.

^b^ As this study contained mainly modelling components relevant to the outcomes, it was assessed for risk of bias as a modelling study.

The systematic and literature reviews were at moderate risk of bias ([Table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"}). The systematic review[@R7] was based on literature from only one health-care database and on a snow-balling strategy that could have introduced selection bias. Neither of the literature reviews included any assessment of the design and quality of the studies that were included or detailed descriptions of the eligibility criteria applied.[@R20]^,^[@R21]

###### Risk of bias assessments of systematic or literature reviews on the effectiveness of travel restrictions to reduce influenza transmission

  Study                               Domain of bias^a^   Funding or sponsorship                                                              
  ----------------------------------- ------------------- ------------------------ ---------- ----- ----- ------ ---------- ----- ----- ----- ------
  Department of Health (2011)[@R20]   Low                 Low                      Moderate   Low   Low   High   Moderate   Low   Low   Low   UKDH
  Department of Health (2012)[@R21]   Low                 High                     Moderate   Low   Low   High   High       Low   Low   Low   UKDH
  Lee et al. (2009)[@R7]              Low                 Low                      Low        Low   Low   Low    Moderate   Low   Low   Low   NS

NS: not specified; UKDH: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Department of Health.

^a^ For each domain of interest, risk of bias was categorized as low if the authors addressed the domain adequately, moderate if the authors' coverage of the domain was superficial or incomplete, and high if the authors reported coverage of the domain was poor.

Synthesis of results
--------------------

### Internal travel restrictions

Travel restrictions appeared to have limited effectiveness in the containment of influenza at local level ([Table 3](#T3){ref-type="table"} and [Table 4](#T4){ref-type="table"}; Table 3 is available at: <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/92/12/14-135590>).

###### Simulated effects of the implementation of internal travel restrictions on the spread and duration of pandemic or epidemic influenza

  Study                                                                                                    Type of restrictions and setting                                                                                       Study design                                                            Influenza strain involved                 Strain transmissibility (*R*~0~)   Scenario and duration interventions                                                                                                                                                                                   Effect estimate
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Bolton et al. (2012)[@R26]                                                                               Internal road and rail, Mongolia                                                                                       Mathematical stochastic model^a^                                        Pandemic influenza A H1N1 pdm09           1.6                                50% travel restriction, 2 weeks                                                                                                                                                                                       Pandemic peak delayed 1 week
  50% travel restriction, 4 weeks                                                                          Pandemic peak delayed 1.5 weeks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
  Brownstein et al. (2006)[@R30]                                                                           Internal and international air, USA                                                                                    Time-series analysis                                                    Seasonal influenza                        1.4, 1.7 or 2.0                    Travel restricted to and from a city with \> 1000 infectious cases or worldwide when \> 1000 such cases in city of origin, the 2001--2002 influenza season                                                            Peak mortality due to influenza delayed 16 days
  Department of Health (2012)[@R21]                                                                        Several scenarios                                                                                                      Literature review (mathematical models)                                 Pandemic influenza                        NS                                 90% internal travel restriction between localities                                                                                                                                                                    Little effect on the length of epidemic and size of peak in each local area
  90% internal travel restriction between localities plus total ban on international flights               Increased spread of national epidemics and desynchronization of epidemics in local areas                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  Ferguson et al. (2006)[@R28]                                                                             Internal air, plus border controls, England, Scotland and Wales in United Kingdom and USA                              Mathematical stochastic model^b^                                        Novel pandemic influenza strain           1.4--2.0                           Internal travel restriction -- implemented when 50 cases reported in affected country -- plus 99%-effective border restrictions stopping entry of infected travellers -- implemented from day 30 of global pandemic   ES delayed 2--3 weeks in USA but not delayed in United Kingdom^c^
  1.4--2.0                                                                                                 Internal travel restriction in USA                                                                                     ES delayed 1 week in USA but not delayed in United Kingdom^d^                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  1.4--2.0                                                                                                 75% internal travel restriction -- i.e. blanket or reactive movement restrictions^e^                                   No impact on ES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
  1.7 or 2.0                                                                                               USA only: border restrictions plus closure of all airports in USA to internal flights                                  With *R*~0~ set to 1.7 or 2.0, EP delayed 49 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  USA only: border restrictions plus reactive movement restrictions with 20-km exclusion zone              With *R*~0~ set to 1.7 or 2.0, EP delayed 54 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  USA only: border restrictions but no blanket movement restrictions                                       With *R*~0~ set to 1.7, EP delayed 60 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  USA only: border restrictions plus 50-km blanket movement restrictions                                   With *R*~0~ set to 1.7 or 2.0, EP delayed 44 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  USA only: reactive movement restrictions with 20-km exclusion zone                                       With *R*~0~ set to 1.7 or 2.0, EP delayed 6 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  USA only: border restrictions plus 20-km blanket movement restrictions                                   With *R*~0~ set to 2.0, EP delayed 60 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  Germann et al. (2006)[@R27]                                                                              Internal, USA                                                                                                          Mathematical stochastic model^b^                                        H5N1 pandemic influenza                   1.6, 1.9. 2.1 or 2.4               90% reduction in long-distance domestic travel when 10 000 symptomatic individuals have been recorded in USA, 180 days                                                                                                EP delayed by a few days -- when *R*~0~ is relatively high -- to a few weeks
  Lee et al. (2012)[@R23]                                                                                  Restrictions on internal migration, restrictions by airplane, car, bus or ship, Republic of Korea                      Mathematical stochastic single-city and multi-city extended models^b^   Human influenza                           1.0, 1.2, 1.5 or 1.8               50% travel restriction, similar parameters all cities, constant infection force                                                                                                                                       Slight -- unspecified -- delay in EP. Size of EP reduced by \< 0.01%
  \> 90% travel restriction, similar parameters all cities, variation in infection force                   Unspecified delay in EP. Delayed spread of epidemic into new cities but increased risk of localized larger outbreaks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  Lee et al. (2009)[@R7]                                                                                   Several scenarios                                                                                                      Systematic review (deterministic and stochastic models)                 Different strains of pandemic influenza   1.7--2.0                           Internal and international air travel restriction                                                                                                                                                                     ES delayed 2--3 weeks if restrictions 99% effective
  Wood et al. (2007)[@R29]                                                                                 Internal, Australia                                                                                                    Mathematical stochastic model^f^                                        Pandemic influenza                        1.5, 2.5 or 3.5                    80% restriction of travel from Sydney to Melbourne, variable infectivity, 2 weeks after epidemic                                                                                                                      With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, ES delayed a median of 32 days
  As above except constant infectivity                                                                     With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 30, 22 and 16 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  As above except peak infectivity                                                                         With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 22, 15 and 11 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  80% restriction of travel from Darwin to Sydney, constant infectivity, 2 weeks after epidemic            With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 34, 17 and 13 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  As above except peak infectivity                                                                         With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 24, 12 and 9 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  80% travel restriction nationwide, 4 weeks after epidemic began                                          No impact with *R*~0~ set to 1.5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  90% restriction of travel from Sydney to Melbourne, constant infectivity, 2 weeks after epidemic began   With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 53, 25 and 18 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  As above except peak infectivity                                                                         With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 32, 17 and 13 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  90% restriction of travel from Darwin to Sydney, constant infectivity, 2 weeks after epidemic began      With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 41, 20 and 15 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  As above except peak infectivity                                                                         With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 25, 14 and 10 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  99% restriction of travel from Sydney to Melbourne, constant infectivity, 2 weeks after epidemic began   With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 75, 34 and 25 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  As above except peak infectivity                                                                         With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 52, 24 and 17 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  99% restriction of travel from Darwin to Sydney, constant infectivity, 2 weeks after epidemic began      With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 75, 30 and 22 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  As above except peak infectivity                                                                         With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, ES delayed a median of 46, 21 and 15 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

EP: epidemic peak; ES: epidemic spread; NS: not specified; *R*~0~: basic reproductive number.

^a^ A so-called SEIAR model, in which individuals who are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious and presented for medical care (I), infectious but not presented for medical care (A) or recovered (R) are considered.

^b^ A so-called SEIR model, in which individuals who are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) or recovered (R) are considered.

^c^ Internal travel restrictions only effective if implemented within 2 weeks of first case in the USA. Border controls only effective if they prevent entrance of 99% of infective travellers and are implemented within 45 days of the start of pandemic.

^d^ Internal travel restrictions only effective if implemented within 2 weeks of first case in the USA.

^e^ With reactive movement restrictions, a 20-km exclusion zone is established around every diagnosed case -- with merging of overlapping zones -- and movement in and out of each exclusion zone is eliminated. With blanket movement restrictions, all journeys by an individual from that individual's home that exceed a certain distance -- often 20 or 50 km -- are eliminated.

^f^ A so-called SIR model, in which individuals who are susceptible (S), infected (I) or recovered (R) are considered.

###### Simulated impact of internal travel restrictions on influenza and influenza-like illness in influenza pandemics or epidemics

  Study                                                                                                   Type of restrictions and setting                                                             Study design                                                Influenza strain involved         Strain transmissibility (*R*~0~)   Scenario and duration of intervention                                                                                      Effect estimate
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------- ---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Bolton et al. (2012)[@R26]                                                                              Internal road and rail, Mongolia                                                             Mathematical stochastic model^a^                            Pandemic influenza A H1N1 pdm09   1.6                                95% travel restriction, 2--4 weeks                                                                                         12% reduction in ILI peak and a reduction in mean attack rate of \< 0.1%, even when restrictions with 95% effectiveness are implemented for 4 weeks
  Ferguson et al. (2006)[@R28]                                                                            Internal air, plus border controls, England, Scotland, and Wales in United Kingdom and USA   Mathematical stochastic model^b^                            Novel pandemic influenza strain   1.4--2.0                           Internal travel restrictions -- i.e. blanket or reactive movement restrictions^c^ -- at 90--100% levels of effectiveness   Reduction in attack rate of \< 2%
  Germann et al. (2006)[@R27]                                                                             Internal, USA                                                                                Stochastic single- city and multi-city extended models^d^   H5N1 pandemic influenza           1.6, 1.9, 2.1 or 2.4               90% reduction in long-distance domestic travel when 10 000 symptomatic individuals have been recorded in USA, 180 days     With *R*~0~ set to 1.6, 1.9, 2.1 and 2.4, cumulative incidence per 100 inhabitants was 32.8 (32.6), 44.0 (43.5), 48.9 (48.5) and 54.1 (53.7) cases, respectively^e^
  Hsieh et al. (2007)[@R22]                                                                               Internal, China                                                                              Mathematical stochastic patch model^d^                      Human seasonal influenza          NS                                 Travel of symptomatic individuals from areas of low prevalence to areas of high prevalence eliminated                      Decreased *R*~0~ to \< 1, preventing spread of epidemic
  Travel of symptomatic individuals from areas of high prevalence to areas of low prevalence eliminated   Increased R~0~ to \> 1, prolonging the epidemic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

ILI: influenza-like illness; NS: not specified; *R*~0~: basic reproductive number.

^a^ A so-called SEIAR model, in which individuals who are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious and presented for medical care (I), infectious but not presented for medical care (A) or recovered (R) are considered.

^b^ A so-called SEIR model, in which individuals who are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) or recovered (R) are considered.

^c^ With reactive movement restrictions, a 20-km exclusion zone is established around every diagnosed case -- with merging of overlapping zones -- and movement in and out of each exclusion zone is eliminated. With blanket movement restrictions, all journeys by an individual from that individual's home that exceed a certain distance -- often 20 or 50 km -- are eliminated.

^d^ A so-called SEIRP model, in which individuals who are susceptible (S), incubating (E), infective (I), recovered (R) or partially immune (P) are considered.

^e^ The values in parentheses indicate the cumulative incidences seen -- in the corresponding baseline scenarios -- with no interventions.

With pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Mongolia, the estimated delay of the pandemic peak varied between 1.0 and 1.5 weeks when 50% road and rail travel restrictions over 2--4 weeks were simulated.[@R26] The corresponding impact on the attack rate was minimal -- e.g. 95% travel restrictions led to a reduction of just 0.1%.[@R26] A study set in the USA revealed similar findings -- e.g. a delay in spread of 2--3 weeks if travel restrictions were 99% effective and implemented in conjunction with border restrictions that prevented the entry of infected travellers.[@R28] Travel restrictions alone could delay spread by 1 week but only if implemented within 2 weeks of the first case.[@R28] In one simulation, border controls preventing 99.9% of cases entering any given country delayed epidemic spread by up to 35 days.[@R24] Another study in the USA presented analogous results -- e.g. a 90% restriction on long-distance flights led to delays in the epidemic peak that ranged between a few days and a few weeks.[@R27] Effectiveness of travel restrictions decreased as the transmissibility of the strain increased; travel restrictions reduced the incidence of new cases by less than 3%.[@R27] According to a time-series analysis in the USA, a 50% restriction in air travel during the 2001--2002 influenza season would have delayed the peak mortality associated with novel strains of seasonal influenza by 16 days -- i.e. compared with the timing of the peak in previous years.[@R30]

Internal travel restrictions in England, Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom were predicted to have minimal impact on the magnitude of the peak and in delaying the spread of the epidemic -- possibly because there are some densely populated urban areas and relatively high levels of population movement.[@R28] However, in a recent review, it was estimated that a combination of internal and international travel restrictions could help to stagger the impact of a pandemic within a country such as the United Kingdom, by desynchronizing localized outbreaks.[@R21] In Australia, it was reported that the impact of 80--99% restriction of air travel between major city hubs was less when varying transmissibility rather than constant transmissibility was simulated. [@R29] In the same investigation, effectiveness fell when strain transmissibility was increased.[@R29] In the Republic of Korea, restriction of travel between cities by more than 50% reduced the epidemic peak by less than 0.01% when constant transmissibility was modelled.[@R23] When variations in transmissibility were simulated, such travel had to be restricted by more than 90% for the epidemic peak to be delayed significantly.[@R23] Travel restrictions would reduce the spread to new cities but could also increase the risk of large localized outbreaks.[@R23] In China, it was observed that overall *R*~0~ would increase if symptomatic travellers were banned from moving from areas with high prevalence of seasonal influenza to areas with low prevalence. When symptomatic travellers were banned from leaving low-prevalence areas, a decrease in overall R~0~ to less than one was predicted.[@R22]

### International travel restrictions

International travel restrictions also appeared to have limited effectiveness ([Table 5](#T5){ref-type="table"} and [Table 6](#T6){ref-type="table"}; Table 6 is available at: <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/92/12/14-135590>). Low-level restrictions -- i.e. restrictions of less than 70% -- were the least effective in containing the spread of epidemics between countries. It was found that a 40% restriction of air travel would only delay the spread of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 from Mexico to other countries by less than 3 days.[@R4] In a high transmissibility scenario, a 20% or even a 50% reduction in the volume of travellers would not have any significant impact on the global spread of influenza A(H5N1).[@R15] In a meta-population model of pandemic influenza, based on the 1968--1969 influenza A(H3N2) pandemic virus it was predicted delays in the epidemic peak of 9 and 14 days with 50% and 90% restriction of air travel, respectively.[@R18]

###### Simulated effects of the implementation of international travel restrictions on the spread and duration of pandemic or epidemic influenza

  Study                                                                                                   Type of restrictions and setting                                                                                                           Study design                                               Influenza strain involved               Strain transmissibility (*R*~0~)   Scenario and duration of intervention                                                                                                                        Effect estimate
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Bajardi et al. (2011)[@R4]                                                                              Air travel, global                                                                                                                         Mathematical stochastic model^a^                           A(H1N1)pdm09 epidemic                   NS                                 40% restriction, \< 6 weeks from epidemic notification                                                                                                       ES to other countries delayed \< 3 days
  90% restriction, \< 6 weeks from epidemic notification                                                  ES to other countries delayed \< 2 weeks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  Any level of restriction, \> 6 weeks from epidemic notification                                         No impact                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
  Brownstein et al. (2006)[@R30]                                                                          Internal and international air travel, USA                                                                                                 Time-series analysis                                       Seasonal influenza                      1.4, 1.7 or 2.0                    Travel restricted to and from a city with \> 1000 infectious cases or worldwide when \> 1000 such cases in city of origin, the 2001--2002 influenza season   Seasonal influenza season prolonged by 16 days
  Chong and Ying Zee (2012)[@R34]                                                                         Air, sea and land travel, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China                                                                   Mathematical stochastic model^a^                           A(H1N1) pdm09                           1.1                                99% air, land and sea travel                                                                                                                                 EP delayed up to 1 year
  1.4                                                                                                     90% air, land and sea                                                                                                                      ES and EP delayed 4 and 6 weeks, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  99% air, land and sea                                                                                   ES and EP delayed 2 and 3 months, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
  99% air and land                                                                                        ES and EP delayed 1--2 and 3.5 weeks, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
  99% air                                                                                                 EP delayed up to 2 weeks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  99% land                                                                                                EP delayed up to 1 week                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  99% sea                                                                                                 EP delayed up to 1 week                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  1.7                                                                                                     90% air, land and sea                                                                                                                      No significant impact on timing of EP                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  99% air, land and sea                                                                                   EP delayed up to 8 weeks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  Ciofi degli Atti et al. (2008)[@R17]                                                                    Air travel, Italy                                                                                                                          Mathematical global determinist model^a^                   A(H5N1)                                 1.4, 1.7 or 2.0                    90% air travel restriction, implemented 30 days after first case in pandemic was recorded or \< 2 months after the introduction of first case in Italy       With *R*~0~ set to 1.4, 1.7 and 2.0, EP delayed median of 23, 10 and 6 days, respectively
  As above except 99% restriction                                                                         With *R*~0~ set to 1.4, 1.7 and 2.0, EP delayed median of 39, 25 and 17 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  Colizza et al. (2007)[@R15]                                                                             Air travel, global                                                                                                                         Mathematical stochastic metapopulation compartmental^b^    A(H5N1)                                 1.9                                20% or 50% air traveller reduction at each connection                                                                                                        No significant impact on EP
  Cooper et al. (2006)[@R16]                                                                              Air travel, global                                                                                                                         Mathematical stochastic metapopulation model^a^            Epidemic and pandemic influenza         1.8^d^                             100% susceptible, 50% air travel reduction, after first 100 symptomatic cases in each city or after 1000 cases in city of origin                             EP delayed median of 7 days
  3^d^                                                                                                    40% susceptible, 90% reduction                                                                                                             EP delayed median of 79 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  As above except 99% reduction                                                                           EP delayed median of 131 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  As above except 99.9% reduction                                                                         EP delayed median of 24 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  100% susceptible, 90% reduction                                                                         EP delayed median of 16 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  As above except 99% reduction                                                                           EP delayed median of 30 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  As above except 99.9% reduction                                                                         EP delayed median of 48 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  5^d^                                                                                                    100% susceptible, 90% reduction                                                                                                            EP delayed median of 13 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  As above except 99% reduction                                                                           EP delayed median of 23 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  As above except 99.9% reduction                                                                         EP delayed median of 35 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  Department of Health (2011)[@R20]                                                                       Evidence-based review                                                                                                                      Literature review                                          Pandemic influenza                      NS                                 90% air travel restriction                                                                                                                                   ES delayed 1--2 weeks
  99% air travel restriction                                                                              ES delayed 2 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
  Department of Health (2012)[@R21]                                                                       Modelling summary                                                                                                                          Literature review                                          Pandemic influenza                      NS                                 90% restriction of air travel into United Kingdom                                                                                                            Delay pandemic wave: 1--2 weeks
  99% restriction of air travel into United Kingdom                                                       Delay pandemic wave: 2 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  Air travel to United Kingdom from South-east Asia -- the theoretical origin of epidemic -- eliminated   90% reduction in entry of infected travellers, EP in United Kingdom delayed 1--2 weeks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  90% restriction in air travel to United Kingdom from all affected countries                             Pandemic wave delayed 3--4 weeks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  As above except 99.9% restriction                                                                       Pandemic wave delayed 3--4 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
  Eichner et al. (2009)[@R25]                                                                             Air and sea travel, Pacific islands                                                                                                        Mathematical model^a^                                      A(H1N1)pdm09                            1.5, 2.25 or 3.0                   79% air and sea travel restriction                                                                                                                           With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.25 and 3.0, probability of introduction epidemic reduced by \< 1-- 65%, \< 1--34% and \< 1--24%, respectively
  As above but 99% restriction                                                                            With *R*~0~ set to 1.5, 2.25 and 3.0, probability of introduction epidemic reduced by \< 0.1--98%, \< 1--95% and \< 1--93%, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  Epstein et al. (2007)[@R31]                                                                             Air travel, global                                                                                                                         Mathematical stochastic metapopulation model modified^a^   Pandemic influenza                      1.7                                Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as source of epidemic, 95% restriction implemented after 1000 infectious cases                                       With epidemic beginning on 1 January or 1 July, ES delayed 13.5 days
  As above except Sydney, Australia, as source of epidemic                                                With epidemic beginning on 1 January and 1 July, ES delayed 27.2 and 6.7 days, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
  As above except London, United Kingdom, as source of epidemic                                           With epidemic beginning on 1 January or 1 July, ES delayed 0 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
  Ferguson et al. (2006)[@R28]                                                                            Internal air, plus border controls, England, Scotland and Wales in United Kingdom and USA                                                  Stochastic mathematical individual-based model^a^          Novel pandemic influenza strain         1.7                                90% restriction on entry of infected individuals                                                                                                             IOE delayed 9 days in (England, Scotland and Wales in United Kingdom) or 15 days (USA)
  As above except 99% restriction                                                                         IOE delayed 25 days (England, Scotland and Wales in United Kingdom) or 29 days (USA)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  As above except 99.9% restriction                                                                       IOE delayed 38 days (England, Scotland and Wales in United Kingdom) or 48 days (USA)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  2.0                                                                                                     90% restriction on entry of infected individuals                                                                                           IOE delayed 10 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
  As above except 99% restriction                                                                         IOE delayed 26 days (England, Scotland and Wales in United Kingdom) or 24 days (USA)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  As above except 99.9% restriction                                                                       IOE delayed 40 days (England, Scotland and Wales in United Kingdom) or 43 days (USA)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  Flahault et al. (2006)[@R18]                                                                            Air travel, 55 cities worldwide                                                                                                            Mathematical deterministic model^a^                        1968--1969-like pandemic influenza      NS                                 50% travel restriction, at the start of the pandemic or, city-by-city, when there is more than one infectious case per 100 000 population                    ES delayed 9 days
  Hollingsworth et al. (2006)[@R33]                                                                       Air travel, global                                                                                                                         Mathematical stochastic model^a^                           H1N1 pandemic influenza                 NS                                 80% air travel restriction, implemented when incidence reaches 100 cases per day                                                                             Export of cases delayed 6.6 days
  As above except 90% restriction                                                                         Export of cases delayed 13 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
  As above except 99% restriction                                                                         Export of cases delayed 133 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  Lam et al. (2011)[@R14]                                                                                 International air travel, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region                                                                          Mathematical deterministic and stochastic models           Pandemic influenza                      1.2, 1.6 or 2.0                    Selective air travel restrictions by age, with total ban of air travel by children, implemented 50 days after pandemic starts                                With *R*~0~ set to 1.2, 1,6 and 2.0, pandemic arrival delayed: 19--35, \< 15 and \< 15 days, respectively
  Lee et al. (2009)[@R7]                                                                                  Systematic review                                                                                                                          Deterministic and stochastic models                        Various strains of pandemic influenza   1.7--2.0                           90% internal and international air travel restrictions                                                                                                       ES delayed 2--3 weeks
  NS                                                                                                      99.9% air travel restriction                                                                                                               National epidemics delayed up to 4 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  2.4                                                                                                     \> 90% restriction of air travel to and from USA                                                                                           No impact observed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  Scalia Tomba and Wallinga (2008)[@R24]                                                                  Border controls, NS                                                                                                                        Mathematical deterministic model^c^                        Pandemic influenza                      2                                  90% reduction of importation of cases                                                                                                                        ES delayed a mean of 11.5 days
  99% reduction of importation of cases                                                                   ES delayed a mean of 23 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  99.9% reduction of importation of cases                                                                 ES delayed a mean of 35 days                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

EP: epidemic peak; ES: epidemic spread; IOE: introduction of epidemic; NS: not specified; *R*~0~: basic reproductive number.

^a^ A so-called SEIR model in which individuals who are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) or recovered (R) are considered.

^b^ A so-called SLIR model in which individuals who are susceptible (S), latent (L), infected (I) or permanently recovered (R) are considered.

^c^ Poisson model.

^d^ Maximum value of *R*~0~ modelled.

###### Measurement of impact of international travel restrictions on attack rate, cumulative incidence, influenza-like illness peak (i.e. number of cases) and on the number of cases of influenza epidemics

  Study                                                           Type of restrictions and setting                                                                                                      Study design                                                              Influenza strain involved                Strain transmissibility (*R*~0~)   Scenario and duration of intervention                                                                                                                             Effect estimate
  --------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Chong and Ying Zee (2012)[@R34]                                 Air, land and sea, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region                                                                            Mathematical stochastic model^a^                                          A(H1N1) pdm2009                          1.1, 1.4 or 1.7                    90% air travel restriction                                                                                                                                        With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 18%, 50% and 72% of NIV, respectively
  99% air travel restriction                                      With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 18%, 49% and 72% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  90% sea travel restriction                                      With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 15%, 55% and 73% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  99% sea travel restriction                                      With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 13%, 54% and 73% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  90% land travel restriction                                     With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 8%, 51% and 71% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  99% land travel restriction                                     With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 5%, 46% and 71% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  90% air and sea travel restriction                              With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 18%, 48% and 70% of non-intervention value, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
  99% air and sea travel restriction                              With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 16%, 45% and 70% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  90% air and land travel restriction                             With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 15%, 40% and 71% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  99% air and land travel restriction                             With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 5%, 35% and 70% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  90% land and sea travel restriction                             With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 15%, 50% and 72% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  99% land and sea travel restriction                             With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 13%, 48% and 72% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  90% air, land and sea travel restriction                        With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was 3%, 28% and 68% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  99% air, land and sea travel restriction                        With *R*~0~ set to 1.1. 1.4 and 1.7, CINC~7~ was \< 1%, \< 5% and 25% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  Ciofi degli Atti et al. (2008)[@R17]                            Air travel, Italy                                                                                                                     Mathematical deterministic metapopulation^a^ and individual-based model   NS                                       1.4, 1.7 or 2.0                    90% air travel restriction, implemented from 30 days after record of first case for the whole pandemic until 2 months after introduction of first case in Italy   With *R*~0~ set to 1.4. 1.7 and 2.0, CAR was 21.2%, 30.8% and 38.7% of NIV and PDAR was 0.42%, 1.01% and 1.90% of NIV, respectively
  As above except 99% air travel restriction                      With *R*~0~ set to 1.4. 1.7 and 2.0, CAR was 21.1%, 30.8% and 38.7% of NIV and PDAR was 0.40%, 1.03% and 1.91% of NIV, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
  Colizza et al. (2007)[@R15]                                     Air travel, global                                                                                                                    Mathematical stochastic metapopulation model^b^                           A(H5N1)                                  1.9                                20% or 50% air travel restriction                                                                                                                                 No impact on CAR
  Epstein et al. (2007)[@R31]                                     Air travel, global                                                                                                                    Mathematical stochastic metapopulation model^c^                           Pandemic influenza                       1.7                                Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as source of epidemic, 95% restrictions implemented after 1000 infectious cases                                           If epidemic begins on 1 January or 1 July, it produces global means of 81 531 156 and 132 230 576 cases, respectively
  As above except Sydney, Australia, as source of epidemic        If epidemic begins on 1 January or 1 July, it produces global means of 33 068 217 and 94 823 730 cases, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  As above except London, United Kingdom, as source of epidemic   If epidemic begins on 1 January or 1 July, it produces global means of 118 523 844 and 7 134 433 cases, respectively                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  Kernéis et al. (2008)[@R19]                                     Air travel, 52 cities worldwide                                                                                                       Mathematical stochastic metapopulation deterministic model^a^             Pandemic influenza strain (NS)           1.8 or 4.9                         Air travel restrictions of unspecified effectiveness, over various, unspecified timelines                                                                         Little effect on global burden or spatial and temporal diffusion of influenza pandemic
  Lee et al. (2009)[@R7]                                          Several scenarios                                                                                                                     Systematic review (deterministic and stochastic models)                   Pandemic influenza (different strains)   1.7 or 2.0                         90%, 99% or 99.9% air travel restriction                                                                                                                          With *R*~0~ set to 1.7 and 2.0 there was, respectively, no impact on overall attack rate and a 1% increase in that rate -- with a 20% increase in PDAR
  Marcelino and Kaiser (2012)[@R32]                               Air travel, 500 major airports, worldwide                                                                                             Mathematical stochastic metapopulation model^a^                           A(H1N1)pdm09                             1.7                                Cancellation of a quarter of flight connections between 500 cities                                                                                                Number of circulating infected individuals reduced by an additional 19%

CAR: cumulative attack rate; CINC~7~: cumulative incidence seven months after start of epidemic; NIV: non-intervention value; NS: not specified; PDAR: peak daily attack rate; *R*~0~: basic reproductive number.

^a^ A so-called SEIR model in which individuals who are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) or recovered (R) are considered.

^b^ A so-called SLIR model in which individuals who are susceptible (S), latent (L), infected (I) or permanently recovered (R) are considered.

^c^ The model took into account individuals who were nonsusceptible (NS), susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) or recovered (R).

In Italy, relatively large delays were reported in reaching an influenza A(H5N1) peak -- i.e. 7--37 days, depending on the level of influenza transmissibility and the extent of the restrictions simulated.[@R17] Travel restrictions had no beneficial effect on attack rate if the level of strain transmissibility was moderate or high.[@R17] In a more recent review, it was estimated that introduction of pandemic influenza into the United Kingdom could be delayed by up to 2 months if there was an almost complete -- e.g. 99.9% -- ban on air travel.[@R20] However, the size of the effect was considerably reduced, to just 1--2 weeks, if the level of restriction was lowered to 90%.[@R20] Similar observations were made in an assessment of the impact of restrictions of air, land and sea travel on the introduction of H1N1 pdm09 into Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), China.[@R34] In this study, it was estimated that restrictions of 90% and 99% on all modes of transportation would delay the epidemic peak by up to 6 and 12 weeks, respectively, when *R*~0~ was set to 1.4.[@R34] When *R*~0~ was set to 1.7, a restriction of 99% on all modes of transportation would delay the epidemic peak by up to 8 weeks and halve the cumulative attack rate. Air travel restrictions appeared to be the most effective isolated intervention, even though most infected cases would probably enter Hong Kong SAR by land travel from mainland China.[@R34] Although one review of the evidence from mathematical modelling concluded that air travel bans would probably have a similar effect irrespective of the pandemic's country of origin,[@R21] another report believed that the effectiveness of such restrictions would vary according to the geographical source of the pandemic.[@R31] If air travel bans delayed the epidemic so that it coincided with the usual influenza season, the apparent number of cases and the size of the peak in the epidemic could both increase.[@R31] However, the opposite trends might be observed if the travel restrictions coincided with a period of low strain transmissibility.[@R31] By restricting air travel by 95%, it should be possible to delay pandemic spread across the USA -- of an infection originating in Sydney or Hong Kong SAR -- by 2--3 weeks.[@R31] However, there was no corresponding impact if the geographical origin of the pandemic was London because of London's high flight densities and interconnectivity.[@R31] The selective cancellation of a quarter of all connection flights between 500 major cities worldwide could be more effective than the closure of all of the cities' airports -- reducing the number of infected travellers by an additional 19%.[@R32] A review of air travel restrictions between Asia and the United Kingdom indicated that such restrictions would stop no more than 90% of infected travellers from the pandemic's country of origin.[@R21] If air travel from all affected countries was restricted by 90.0% and 99.9%, the pandemic wave would be delayed by 3--4 weeks and up to 4 months, respectively,[@R21]^,^[@R28] but such intensive restrictions would clearly have negative social and economic impacts. A systematic review found that extensive air travel restrictions -- e.g. restrictions of more than 90% -- could delay the spread of pandemics by up to 4 months if the strains involved had low to moderate transmissibility.[@R7] However, such restrictions appeared ineffective if the strains involved had high transmissibility -- i.e. if *R*~0~ was 2.4.[@R7] In general, a combination of interventions appeared to be more effective than the implementation of travel restrictions in isolation.[@R7]

Discussion
==========

The results of our systematic review indicate that overall travel restrictions have only limited effectiveness in the prevention of influenza spread, particularly in those high transmissibility scenarios in which *R*~0~ is at least 1.9 ([Box 2](#B2){ref-type="boxed-text"}). The effect size varied according to the extent and timeliness of the restrictions, the size of the epidemic, strain transmissibility, the heterogeneity of the travel patterns, the geographical source and the urban density of international travel hubs. Only extensive travel restrictions -- i.e. over 90% -- had any meaningful effect on reducing the magnitude of epidemics. In isolation, travel restrictions might delay the spread and peak of pandemics by a few weeks or months but we found no evidence that they would contain influenza within a defined geographical area.

###### Summary of findings of the 23 studies assessed

Internal travel restrictions: general observations
--------------------------------------------------

-   Have limited effectiveness

-   Delay pandemic spread by about 1 week

-   Delay pandemic peak by about 1.5 weeks

-   Have little impact on magnitude of pandemics -- e.g. they may reduce attack rates by \< 2%

-   Simulated impact is particularly weak in scenarios that involve strains with high transmissibility

Internal travel restrictions: risk of bias assessment
-----------------------------------------------------

-   Relevant studies have low to moderate risk of bias

-   Paucity of data on terrestrial travel may have led to an overestimation of the impact of travel restrictions

-   Many simulations take no account of the characteristics of human populations -- e.g. the mixing and variation of susceptibility across age groups -- or of seasonality. Such limitations could well have affected the simulated spread of pandemic waves and impacts of interventions

International travel restrictions: general observations
-------------------------------------------------------

-   Have limited effectiveness -- e.g. 90% air travel restriction in all affected countries may delay spread of pandemics by 3--4 weeks

-   Have minimal impact on the magnitude of pandemics, typically reducing attack rates by less than 0.02%

-   May prolong the seasonal influenza season

-   May result in higher epidemic peak if resultant delay causes pandemic wave to coincide with seasonal influenza wave

-   Simulated impact particularly weak in scenarios that involve strains with high transmissibility

-   Extensive restriction of international air travel might delay introduction of a pandemic into a country by up to 2 months and delay pandemic spread by 3--4 months

-   Would not prevent introduction of a pandemic into any given country

-   May give time for other interventions -- e.g. the production and distribution of effective vaccines and antiviral drugs

-   Social and economic impacts need to be evaluated

International travel restrictions: specific measures
----------------------------------------------------

-   May have benefits compared with more widespread restrictions -- e.g. in one simulation, compared with the closure of all of the cities' airports, the targeted reduction of a quarter of flight connections between 500 major cities gave a greater reduction in the number of infected travellers

-   Compared with banning air travel by adults, the banning of air travel by children may be more effective at delaying the spread of a pandemic but is socially impractical

International travel restrictions: risk of bias assessment
----------------------------------------------------------

-   Relevant studies have low to moderate risk of bias

-   A paucity of data on travel by sea and land may have led to an overestimation of the impact of air travel restrictions on the containment of influenza pandemics

-   Much of the information available on air travel has a lack of detail on flight destinations and numbers of travellers and this may have led to inaccurate assumptions being made about the spread of influenza

-   Again, many simulations take no account of the characteristics of human populations -- e.g. the mixing and variation of susceptibility across age groups -- or of seasonality and such limitations could well have affected the simulated spread of pandemic waves and impacts of interventions

-   When simulating novel pandemic strains, validation of models was an issue; mathematical models need to be validated against surveillance data to improve their value as predictive tools for policy-makers

Several limitations associated with our review warrant discussion. We included mathematical modelling studies that simulated very diverse scenarios with varying levels of *R*~0~, geographical locations, means of transportation, strains and population characteristics. A paucity of surveillance data concerning the impact and effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions meant that our observations had to be mainly based on simulations.[@R6] While mathematical models are important tools that can be used to inform policy-makers, they cannot account fully for all aspects of real-life situations.

The lack of available data from observational or experimental studies precluded the conduct of the meta-analysis and sensitivity analysis that formed part of the protocol that we registered.[@R8] Most of the studies that we included in our review used probabilistic models that appeared to have adequate levels of complexity to simulate disease spread and the impact of interventions. In comparison, deterministic models are less complex and do not take uncertainty into account but are still useful when limited data are available and a rapid simulation is needed.[@R7] Most of the studies we reviewed were limited by a lack of consideration of heterogeneous mixing, socioeconomic status and the relationship between age and immunity.[@R37] Many also simulated constant strain transmissibility during epidemics -- even though transmissibility can vary over time because of seasonal climactic conditions, changes in host susceptibility and the effects of interventions such as social distancing, quarantine and the use of antiviral drugs.[@R38] The authors of some of the articles noted concerns that may have affected model accuracy, such as issues with the quality of air travel data -- e.g. a lack of flight itineraries[@R28] -- and the need to use crude estimates of the volume of travellers within and between countries. There was a general paucity of data on land and sea travel,[@R25] although one of the studies provided comprehensive data on such travel.[@R34] The tool we developed to assess the risk of bias in the mathematical modelling studies has not been validated and could have produced imprecise estimates.

The results of several studies indicate that, in reducing the global spread of influenza and the overall number of infected individuals, a combination of several different interventions is more effective than any single isolated measure.[@R16]^,^[@R17]^,^[@R34] One study estimated that, when the strains involved have moderate transmissibility, a combination of antiviral prophylaxis, extensive travel restrictions and infant vaccination could reduce the cumulative attack rate by 77--87%.[@R17] However, effective vaccines are not generally available at the point of emergence of a novel pandemic virus. The effectiveness of combined or single interventions can be affected by the timeliness of the implementation[@R4]^,^[@R39] and this appears to be particularly relevant with strains of higher transmissibility.[@R34]

Often, in the context of pandemic preparedness and response, travel restrictions -- especially at points of entry -- have intuitive appeal to policy-makers because they demonstrate that a tangible attempt is being made to prevent the ingress of a novel virus or prevent onward spread. However, such an attempt is not always effective. *WHO interim protocol: rapid operations to contain the initial emergence of pandemic influenza* is implicitly focused on the creation of geographical cordons within a country and places more emphasis on the restriction of travel by land than on restrictions of air or sea travel.[@R1] However, the relevant data that are available seem to indicate that restrictions on land travel would have a limited impact on containment or even on the slowing of transmission.[@R34]

It seems likely that, for delaying the spread and reducing the magnitude of an epidemic in a given geographical area,[@R7] a combination of interventions would be more effective than isolated interventions.[@R16]^,^[@R34] Travel restrictions per se would not be sufficient to achieve containment in a given geographical area, and their contribution to any policy of rapid containment is likely to be limited.
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